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I. Introduction
When drafting a patent application, inventors or their legal
representatives must carefully choose the language and terms
employed in the claims section. A particular problem arises in a
granted patent when a term with multiple definitions creates
ambiguity in the interpretation of the claims and the scope of
protection provided therein. How should courts determine which
definition controls? Which authorities should be consulted, and if
multiple authorities are consulted, how much weight should each
carry respectively? These are some of the questions that the
Federal Circuit seeks to address in its en banc rehearing of Phillips
v. A WH Corp.
2
The outcome of Phillips will significantly affect both the
drafting of future patent applications and the interpretation of all
patents, including those granted prior to this case. This Recent
Development reviews the basic tenets of claim construction and
considers whether the Federal Circuit should continue to favor, as
it has increasingly been inclined to do, a formalistic method of
interpretation that focuses on how dictionaries define terms in the
claim. After considering the impact an adoption of such formalism
may have on patent drafting and fair competition, this Recent
Development argues that the Federal Circuit should retreat from
this position upon rehearing Phillips.
1 J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2006.
2 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (granting petition for en bane rehearing).
II. The Patent Claim: Interpretive Methodologies and
Clarification of Ambiguities
A. Roles of Judge and Jury in the Enforcement of
Patent Rights
When an inventive entity, whether an individual, a group of
individuals, or a corporation, seeks to enforce its patent rights
against an alleged infringer, it must show that the allegedly
infringing product or process is covered by the claims section of
the inventor's patent. To determine whether the product infringes
the patent, the patent holder must interpret the claims section of the
patent and decide whether the other party's product actually
infringes the patent as construed.4 In Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that claim
construction is an issue of law to be decided by judges, while
5infringement is an issue of fact to be determined by a jury. As a
result of this case, pre-trial hearings, commonly referred to as
Markman hearings, are now held outside the presence of the jury to
resolve interpretive ambiguities in a patent claim.
B. Written Description Requirement
Under federal patent law, a patent's "specification shall
contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains.., to make and use the same [invention].'6 In order to
meet this requirement, the inventor must "describ[e] the invention,
with all its claimed limitations." 7 This means that the claims must
be supported by the written description in the specification, and the
3 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996).
4 Id. at 384.
5 Id. at 371 (reaffirming the holding of Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 338
(1853)).
6 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
7 Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(quoting Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1997)) (emphasis omitted).
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claims may have no more breadth than what is described in the
specification. 8 Because the claims must be read in light of the
specification, 9 it is imperative that a patent drafter describe the
invention with clarity in the specification.'
C. Sources of Evidence in Claim Construction
Two commonly used sources of evidence in claim
construction are the claims themselves and the specification.
According to the Federal Circuit, terms within a claim "are
generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, [but] a
patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in
a manner other than their ordinary meaning, as long as the special
definition of the term is clearly stated in the patent specification or
file history."' 1 As a result, "it is always necessary to review the
specification to determine whether the inventor has used any terms
in a manner inconsistent with their ordinary meaning. The
specification acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms
used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication." 12 The
Federal Circuit has further asserted that, "[u]sually, [the
specification] is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the
meaning of a disputed term."
13
These sources-the specification and the claims-along
with the prosecution history14 are considered intrinsic evidence that
8 Id. at 1480 ("Claims may be no broader than the supporting disclosure, and
therefore ... a narrow disclosure will limit claim breadth.").
9 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en banc) ("Claims must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a
part.").
'0 See, e.g., Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1480 (deciding that narrowness of the
specification limited the plaintiffs claims so as to preclude a finding of
infringement outside the scope of the specification).
" Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).12 id.
13 Id.
14 Vitronics states,
[The prosecution] history contains the complete record of all
the proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office,
including any express representations made by the applicant
regarding the scope of the claims. As such, the record before
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may be consulted when construing claim language. 5 Aside fromthe intrinsic evidence, courts may also consult extrinsic evidence.' 6Extrinsic evidence may include expert testimony, inventortestimony, dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises. 17
D. Role of Dictionaries, Encyclopedias, and Treatises
Although dictionaries' 8 have been considered valid sourcesof evidence in patent cases dating as far back as the 1940s,19 theirvalidity as extrinsic evidence was affirmed in multiple cases in themid-1990s, around the time of the Markman decision.20Nevertheless, dictionaries were not considered a primary source ofevidence until the Federal Circuit decided Texas Digital Systems,Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.21 in 2002. In Telegenix, the Federal Circuitasserted that "[cionsulting the written description and prosecutionhistory as a threshold step in the claim construction process, beforeany effort is made to discern the ordinary and customary meaningsattributed to the words themselves, invites a violation of ourprecedent counseling against importing limitations into the
claims.' ' 22 The court further stated:
By examining relevant dictionaries, encyclopedias
and treatises to ascertain possible meanings that
would have been attributed to the words of the
claims by those skilled in the art, and by further
utilizing the intrinsic record to select from those
the Patent and Trademark Office is often of critical
significance in determining the meaning of the claims.
I Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1995).16Id. ("Extrinsic evidence may also be considered, if needed to assist indetermining the meaning or scope of technical terms in the claims.").17 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995)(en banc).
18 The term "dictionary" is used in the remainder of this Recent Development toinclude dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises, unless otherwise indicated.19See, e.g., In re Ripper, 171 F.2d 297, 299 (C.C.P.A. 1948).20 E.g., Marknan, 52 F.3d at 980; Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995).21 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002).22 Id. at 1204.
possible meanings the one or ones most consistent
with the use of the words by the inventor, the full
breadth of the limitations intended by the inventor
will be more accurately determined and the
improper importation of unintended limitations
from the written description into the claims will be
more easily avoided.23
This decision was seen as a significant move toward formalism in
claim construction.24
The Telegenix court held that the intrinsic record must be
examined, but only to ensure that the "ordinary and customary
meaning" is not rebutted or, if there are multiple definitions, to
determine which was intended.25 The court's decision established
dictionaries as the initial source of evidence in patent claim
construction. This holding appears irreconcilable with the past
holdings of the Court. The Federal Circuit had previously held that
the intrinsic evidence should be examined first, and if any
ambiguities in claim construction remain, sources of extrinsic
evidence may be consulted.26 In Telegenix, however, the court
stated dictionaries are outside the classification of extrinsic
evidence.27 This appears to be an attempt to avoid reversing its
past holdings.28 The Federal Circuit backed away from treating
231Id. at 1205.
24 See Ruoyu R. Wang, Texas Digital Systems v. Telegenix, Inc.: Toward a
More Formalistic Patent Claim Construction Model, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
153, 162-73 (2004) (providing a more in depth analysis of this transition and
arguments for it).
25 Telegenix, 308 F.3d at 1204 ("The intrinsic record also must be examined in
every case to determine whether the presumption of ordinary and customary
meaning is rebutted.").
26 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
("Only if there were still some genuine ambiguity in the claims, after
consideration of all available intrinsic evidence, should the trial court have
resorted to extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony, in order to construe [the
claim].").
27 Telegenix, 308 F.3d at 1203 ("Categorizing [dictionaries, encyclopedias, and
treatises] as 'extrinsic evidence' or even a 'special form of extrinsic evidence' is
misplaced and does not inform the analysis.").
28 See Jennifer R. Johnson, Out of Context: Texas Digital, the Indefiniteness of
Language, and the Search for Ordinary Meaning, 35 J.L. & TECH 521 (2004).
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dictionaries as extrinsic evidence, as it had in Markman, by placing
them in their own category.29
E. Phillips v. A WH Corp.
Recently the Federal Circuit chose to reexamine the trend
toward a formalistic approach to claim construction.3 ° In Phillips
v. A WH Corp.,31 the plaintiff patented a design for modular wall
panels that could be used in correctional facilities because of their
"desirable sound and fire resistance, impact resistance (i.e., against
bullets, bombs), and axial and lateral load bearing qualities., 32 In
Phillips, the Federal Circuit largely focused on the definition of the
term "baffle" as used in the patent claims. The alleged infringer
"assert[ed] that the key innovative feature of the invention [was]
the baffle configuration, including both the angled orientation and
the interlocking pattern limitations., 33 If the baffles constituted the
key innovative feature, then infringement would most likely be
precluded if the allegedly infringing product did not have baffles as
construed in the patent.
Following the procedure set forth in Telegenix, the court
examined the dictionary before consulting the intrinsic evidence.
The court relied in part on the Webster's Dictionary definition of
baffle in determining its ordinary meaning: "something for
deflecting, checking, or otherwise regulating flow." 34 The court
then examined the specification and determined that it treated the
term more restrictively than the dictionary definition.35 As a result,
it concluded the use of the term "baffle" in the claims section was
restricted to have a characteristic angle of other than 90 degrees, a
29 See id. (arguing that the assertion in Telegenix that dictionaries are improperly
considered extrinsic is illogical).
30 For an enumerated list of the issues being reheard, see Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
31 363 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
32 d. at 1209.
"3Id. at 1212.34 Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 162 (3d ed.
1993)).
31 Phillips, 363 F.3d. at 1213.
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limitation not imposed by the dictionary definition.3 6 The
dictionary definition would clearly benefit the plaintiff-patentee,
since it would provide broader protection and allow the court to
find infringement. The court chose to use the definition in the
specification and found for the defendant.
37
Not satisfied with the method of claim construction in
Phillips, the Federal Circuit has granted a motion for an en banc
rehearing "in order to resolve issues concerning the construction of
patent claims raised by the now-vacated [prior panel holding]."38
Having already decided to consider a number of claim construction
issues, the court now has the perfect opportunity to reexamine its
past decisions regarding dictionary usage. The court should take
advantage of this opportunity because, as illustrated by Phillips,
courts struggle in trying to construe claims using dictionary
definitions. The vacated Phillips opinion also provides a clear
example of the court's usage of the construction methodology
advocated in Telegenix.
III. Detrimental Effects of Favoring Dictionaries
A. Battle of the Dictionaries
The Federal Circuit has held that when the ordinary
meaning of a term can be determined from dictionary definitions
and intrinsic evidence, there is no need to consult expert
witnesses. 39 Replacing experts with dictionaries, of course,
sidesteps the proverbial "battle of the experts," which can be a
lengthy, confusing, and costly affair. Avoiding such battles is
arguably best for both sides, and that may be one of the main
reasons the Federal Circuit has increasingly preferred to use
dictionaries in claim construction.
Using dictionaries, however, may give rise to a slightly
different kind of battle. Like experts, dictionaries of different
makes and time periods can offer diverse meanings on the same
36 id.
3 7 
id.
38 Phillips, 376 F.3d at 1382.
39 CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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term.40 As a result, a "battle of the experts" can be replaced with a
"battle of the dictionaries," and a court could be faced with the
potentially daunting decision as to which dictionary should control.
Favoring dictionaries may be doing nothing more than replacing
one problem with another.
B. Patents vs. Contracts
In justifying its decision in Telegenix, the Federal Circuit
referred to the use of dictionaries for interpretation of contracts.4'
A contract is generally defined as "[a]n agreement between two or
more parties creating obligations that are enforceable or otherwise
recognizable at law.",42 A patent, however, is "an agreement
between an inventor and the public, represented by the federal
government: in return for a full public disclosure of the invention
the inventor is granted the right for a fixed period of time to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the defined invention
.... , An important distinction is that a contract only affects the
rights of the "two or more parties" in agreement, while a patent
affects the rights of the public, on whose behalf the government
makes the agreement.
Since the public's rights are affected by terms to which it is
not directly agreeing, it is imperative that the patent give adequate
public notice of how those rights are affected.44 On the other hand,
public notice would appear to play a minimal role, if any, in a
contract, since the parties themselves are agreeing to its terms.
Further, any ambiguities may be resolved prior to agreeing to the
contract. The importance of the notice function of patents
becomes more clear when fair competition and the costs involved
in designing around a patent are more closely examined.
40 See Johnson, supra note 28 (describing the difficulty of competing
dictionaries, using Novartis Pharm. v. Eon Labs Mfg., 363 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2004), a split-panel decision, as an example).
4 1 Telegenix, 308 F.3d at 1203.
42 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 318 (7th ed. 1999).
43 Id. at 1147 (quoting E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW PRIMER 7-11 (2d ed. 1982)).
44 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997)
("Claims do indeed serve both a definitional and a notice function.").
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C. Effect on Notice Function and Fair Competition
Public notice is an important function of patents because
they grant a limited form of monopoly, excluding others from
producing the invention without the patent holder's permission.45
If courts show a strong preference toward dictionary definitions,
patent applicants might make an effort to employ the terms used in
their applications according to the dictionary definitions, creating
normative patent claim drafting.46 At first blush, the benefits of a
normative method of drafting appear significant. A normative
method would make the meaning of claims morepredictable,
facilitating the public notice function of patents. Expecting these
benefits to fully come to fruition, however, is overly optimistic.
There are a number of practical difficulties that competitors face
when dictionaries are the primary source of interpretation.
As the Federal Circuit stated in Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc. 48
The claims, specification, and file history, rather
than extrinsic evidence, constitute the public record
of the patentee's claim, a record on which the public
is entitled to rely. In other words, competitors are
entitled to review the public record, apply the
established rules of claim construction, ascertain
the scope of the patentee's claimed invention and,
thus, design around the claimed invention.49
If this procedure is followed, competitors must employ the
approach of Telegenix. As a result, competition will be hampered
45 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
730 (2002) (stating "patent laws... reward[] innovation with a temporary
monopoly.").
46 See Wang, supra note 24, at 170-71 (claiming "[formalism] gradually reduces
courts' interpretive burdens and mistakes, increases interpretive accuracy and
predictability, and encourages a norm formation for patent drafting.").
47 See id. at 169-70 (arguing "[flormalism... advances the public notice
function more because it predictably emphasizes the meanings of claims within
the four comers of a patent.").
48 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).49 Id. at 1583 (emphasis added).
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and the consuming public will likely be injured.50 Rather than
looking first to the intrinsic record to resolve ambiguities in claim
terms, competitors must begin by consulting a dictionary in order
to ascertain the ordinary meaning of the terms. This method of
interpretation can give rise to difficult questions. For example,
what type of source should be consulted-a dictionary,
encyclopedia, or treatise? And how technologically specific
should that source be? Also, if there are multiple sources to
choose from, it may be quite difficult to decide which one should
control.
Since competitors must look to the version of the source
that was available at the time the patent application was
processed,5' they are in a challenging position. Not only is it
extremely difficult to decide which source to consult, but the
source may be unavailable. Could the courts expect competitors to
find sources that were in place up to twenty years52 prior to the
date of their analysis of the patents? 53 This would appear to be
necessary after Telegenix. Even if competitors could figure out
which version and edition of dictionary controls,54 they would still
have to spend time locating the particular source, which may be
difficult to find.
50 For a contrary perspective see Wang, supra note 24, at 169-70.
51 "Dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises, publicly available at the time the
patent is issued, are objective resources that serve as reliable sources of
information on the established meanings that would have been attributed to the
terms of the claims by those of skill in the art." Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v.
Telegenix, 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
52 Utility patents generally provide protection for a term of twenty years from
the date of filing an application. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
53 Some libraries may keep older versions of dictionaries on file. However, this
is much less likely with treatises, which are often in loose-leaf binders and
updated by replacing pages or sections. See LexisNexis, LexisNexis Bookstore,
at
http://bookstore.lexis.com/bookstore/catalog?action=product&toc-t&print=y&p
rod id=1011 &catid=W (lasted visited Nov. 19, 2004) (showing that Chisum
on Patents, a leading treatise on U.S. patent law, is "updated by replacement
pages five times per year").
54 See Johnson, supra note 28 (arguing that "competitors cannot be sure of the
proper meaning of words in the claims, and thus are more likely to infringe the
patent or litigate the issue" when the court employs dictionaries sua sponte in
claim construction).
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The difficulties associated with choosing and locating the
right dictionary add to the cost of designing around a patent.
These costs would be reduced if the Federal Circuit retreated to the
methodology in place prior to Telegenix, looking first to the
written description. If the written description adequately defines a
term that appears ambiguous in the claims, the competitor would
have no need to look elsewhere. Only the patents in which the
written description does not adequately define claim terms would
require a search for relevant extrinsic evidence. Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit should conclude the approach in Telegenix is both
illogical and economically inefficient.
If an entity acquires a limited monopoly, it seems
inequitable to raise the costs for competitors to offer similar
products or services outside that monopoly. Once costs pass a
threshold, many competitors may forego offering such products or
services. If this occurs, consumers have fewer choices, resulting in
a less efficient market. Although patents, by their exclusive
nature, limit consumer choices, such limitations should be confined
as closely as possible to the scope of the patent. By unduly
hampering competition and increasing costs for competitors, the
consuming public loses out due to fewer choices and higher prices.
IV. Conclusion
The Federal Circuit prudently chose to re-examine and
clarify the role of dictionaries in patent claim construction.
Though dictionaries can play a beneficial role in claim
construction, the court should put them back on the shelf and
redirect the focus to the patent's specification and intrinsic
evidence. By making dictionary consultation the threshold step in
determining the meaning of patent terms, the Telegenix decision
potentially creates a number of problems for the courts,
competitors, and consumers. The courts still have the problem of
competing authorities, and both courts and competitors are forced
to take steps that may otherwise be unnecessary, likely resulting in
fewer choices and higher costs for consumers. Even if the Federal
Circuit in the en banc rehearing in Phillips reaffirms the use of
dictionaries as interpretive tools, the court should at least
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reestablish the written specification as the initial source of
authority. Doing so would eliminate the inefficiency of
ascertaining and locating appropriate sources in cases where the
intrinsic record is sufficient. This would greatly limit the
aforementioned problems and provide a sound policy.
